In this paper we assess incentives for clean technology adoption by …rms that compete à la Cournot in local product markets subject to a tradable emission permits regulation. Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that permits prices may increase after clean technology adoption. Herein we show that, since strategic …rms are able to predict such increase, this results in a non-innovation equilibrium (even for very low adoption costs). To the light of the previous result, we …nd a su¢ cient condition for the cap on emissions to ensure positive innovation incentives.
Introduction
incentives. The structure of the model is inspired by the technology-linked-markets setup proposed by Zanaj (2006, 2008) and the innovation game is inspired by Gabszewicz and Garella (1995) when modelling the decision of internalizing the production of an intermediate good.
Most of the literature on environmental innovation is devoted to the comparison of the innovation incentives under alternative pollution control rules. With the exception of Montero (2002), in general this literature considers the output market as competitive (Parry, 1998 and Requate, 1998) . Montero (2002) de…nes innovation as investing in an R&D sector, which produces a (proportional) decrease in the separable cost of abatement per unit of R&D invested. In this context, he studies the impact of strategic interactions in the output market on innovation incentives when the market for tradable emission permits is cleared through (Nash) bargaining between two strategic …rms. He …nds that one …rm's innovation decreases permits prices which, on one hand, reduces its production costs (direct e¤ect) but, on the other hand, increases competition in the output market (strategic e¤ect) due to the decrease in the rival's production costs. The incentives to innovate then depend on the net e¤ect. Herein, as in Sanin and Zanaj (2011) , the direct e¤ect may be by itself positive or negative and therefore may add-up to the strategic e¤ect. In this context, we show how innovation incentives depend on …rms position in the permits market, on the rate of regionwide innovation and on output strategic interaction in the local markets, which in turn are a function of the constraint imposed by the cap. In particular, the cap on emissions will be more or less restrictive depending on the elasticity of output demand and, together with the increase on emissions e¢ ciency due to the new technology, will determine whether the price of permits increases or not after innovation (Sanin and Zanaj, 2011 ). This last e¤ect will bene…t sellers or buyers, determining whether an innovation equilibrium arises or not. To the light of the previous result, we …nd a condition for the cap on emissions considered in each NAP to ensure positive innovation incentives.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the assumptions and solve the sequential game played by the …rms. In Section 3 we analyze equilibria and discuss the importance of the cap on emissions to induce an innovation equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
The model
Inspired by the organization of the EU-ETS, we assume that there are n identical countries subject to a region-wide cap on emissions nS. All countries are assumed to be identical: each country, according to its NAP, allocates an amount S of permits for free to …rms operating in its local market. Assume there are two strategic …rms producing a homogenous good in each local market and that the production of the good generates emissions as a by-product.
A percentage of S is allocated to …rm i and a percentage (1 ) is allocated to …rm j. These percentages are common knowledge. If permits received are not enough (or more than enough) to produce optimal output, …rms trade in the market for permits (locally or regionally).
We assume that …rms play a Cournot game in the local output market producing good y.
Their technology is given by
where E stands for emissions (or use of permits) and K l is …rm's l productivity of emissions.
Without innovation, emission's productivity is K l = 1; l = i; j: 6 Firms can choose to implement a clean technology, i.e. a technology that would increase emission's productivity to K;
The choice of technology is modelled as a two-stages game: in the …rst stage …rms simultaneously choose their production technology given their expectations regarding the level of adoption in the region (and consequently their expected price of permits q e ). Such choice is done by comparing their pro…ts in the output market and in the permits market when using the clean technology (after paying the …xed cost of implementation F ) as opposed to using the dirty technology. In the second stage …rms choose how much to produce y and trade permits to maximize pro…ts. We …nd the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) that are ful…lled expectations equilibria using backward induction. In our setup, a ful…lled expectation equilibrium is a permit market equilibrium (and the corresponding output market solution) in which the expectations of …rms about the permit price are accomplished at the equilibrium of the game. As in Katz and Shapiro (1985) , we …nd the conditions for an innovation (non-innovation or partial adoption) equilibrium to arise in a local market when …rms expect a region-wide innovation (non-innovation or partial adoption) equilibrium and its corresponding permits price. 8 
Second stage: Cournot-Nash production game
Given the technology choice done in the previous stage and linear output demand, pro…ts of …rms are 6 We could think of a relationship between the amount of input x used for production and emissions E of
Solving for x; we would obtain the technological relation between emissions and output in (1). 7 We shall restrict 1 K 2 to ensures the existence of equilibrium in the permits market by yielding positively sloped supply of permits. 8 Nonetheless, we analyse the sets of parameters where a FEE does not exist in Appendix B.
where
) and where q e is the expected permits price.
After computing the …rst order conditions (FOCs) and solving the system of equations we …nd the optimal use of permits
The corresponding pro…ts are
First stage: technology adoption game
Herein we derive the Nash equilibria in the technology adoption game for given expectations on other …rms'adoption and consequently on q e :
No …rm adopts if and only if (i¤)
; l = i; j; and only one …rm adopts
Each …rm participates in the market for permits as a buyer or a seller depending on the di¤erence between their needs of permits for production, summarized in (4) and (5), and the endowment of permits they received for free, S or (1 )S; respectively in each of the n local markets. Since we consider that all local markets in the region are identical, the previous implies that total supply (or demand) of permits is n S
(1 ) S . The demand and supply of permits come from many industries and these industries are assumed to be of the same numerosity.
Equalizing demand with supply in the market for permits yields the price of permits
K (2 3KS) ; : Substituting the above expressions for permit prices in (4) and (5), one obtains the levels of emissions in all outcomes of the game, namely (
It is easy to see that equilibrium emissions'levels are always positive in the symmetric outcomes, whereas the asymmetric outcome of the game is only de…ned for KS 2
It is shown in Appendix A that in the previous set of parameters, pro…ts are positive in all the outcomes of the game. Thus, our game is de…ned when
Most literature on environmental innovation …nds that, after implementing a clean technology, the price of permits decreases even when considering a non-competitive setting (see Montero, 2000) . Here, as in Sanin and Zanaj (2011), the price of permits after innovation q 1 may be higher or lower than the price without innovation. In particular, it will be higher than q 1 when the pair fS; Kg is such that S <
3(1+K)
. This threshold makes the cap binding, restricting output production in equilibrium such that demand is met in its region of high demand elasticity (see Sanin and Zanaj, 2011 for details).
Equilibria analysis
In this section, we identify the ful…lled expectations innovation and non-innovation equilibria and in the following subsections we provide some comparative statics to analyze their characteristics. Through that process, we are able to disentangle innovation incentives as a function of output market characteristics and regulatory policy constraints. FEE can be found by imposing, for each case, the expected permits price to be equal to the realized permits price. Then, Lemma 1 A non-innovation FEE obtains if and only if F F 0 (q 0 ); a partial adoption FEE obtains if and only if F 2 (q 1 ) F F 0 (q 1 ) and an innovation FEE obtains if and only if
The previous thresholds on the …xed innovation costs are non-linear functions of the improvement in e¢ ciency K o¤ered by the new technology and of the cap on emissions S; which together determine the elasticity of output demand at which …rms are serving and would serve the local market after innovation. They determine the values of the pairs of fS; Kg for which the increase in pro…ts in the output and in the permits market after innovation justify, or not, to cover the …xed cost F . Using the above thresholds of …xed costs (10), we build Fig 1 to display The upper dashed curve is the curve of F 0 (q 0 ) above which FEE non-innovation equilibria arise; while innovation equilibria arise for relatively small levels of …xed costs, i.e., below the last dashed curve: F F 2 (q 2 ): For intermediate levels of …xed costs (area between the two full-line curves) a partial innovation equilibrium arises. These scenarios are result of the incentives to innovate dictated by the change in market share in the local output market and by the cost or revenue to buy or sell permits in the global permits market (as we will detail in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). From Fig 1, it is interesting to notice that the set of parameters where FEE partial equilibria arise shrinks as the total number of permits issued by the authority increases. Moreover, for very high S and low …xed cost of innovation; the FEE equilibria with full innovation are also not very likely because the for such high levels of S the corresponding output receipts for both …rms is quite low. For these levels of S and F it is worth to notice that Cournot equilibria where the expectations of …rms about permit prices are very likely to arise.
The FEE equilibria derived are unique for all relevant values of the pairs fK; Sg since it is easy to show that F 0 (q 0 ) > F 0 (q 1 ) and F 2 (q 1 ) > F 2 (q 2 ):Importantly, it also holds that
Then, there exists a set of parameters F 2 fF 2 (q 2 ); F 2 (q 1 )g [ fF 0 (q 1 ); F 0 (q 0 )g ; where no FEE exists. In this set of parameters, the Cournot equilibrium of the production game exists but these Cournot equilibria are not FEE. 9 In these Cournot equilibria the expectations of …rms about permit prices are not ful…lled. In this set, there can be a Cournot 9 The existence of a Cournot equilibrium is guarantied by the standard concavity assumptions that our model satis…es.
equilibrium (symmetric or asymmetric) depending on the expectations of …rms regarding q e :
An asymmetric Cournot equilibrium arises if one of the …rms believes wrongly that q 2 (or q 0 ) will prevail in the global permit market, while the other expects q 1 ; which is the price that indeed prevails. The levels of …xed costs corresponding to this set are neither low enough (i.e. F 2 fF 2 (q 2 ); F 2 (q 1 )g ) to induce the correct expectation that an asymmetric equilibrium will prevail; nor high enough (i.e. F 2 fF 0 (q 1 ); F 0 (q 0 )g) to induce the correct expectation that a non-innovation equilibrium will prevail at the global permit market. It is also possible that a non innovation Cournot equilibrium arises if one …rm expects q 2 to prevail and the other expects q 0 (and none of the …rms has incentive to innovate). In any case, these errors in expectations can be corrected in a learning process if the interaction among …rms is durable 10 . A more detailed analysis of the nonexistence of FEE is provided in Appendix B.
Non-innovation FEE
In this section, we investigate the non-innovation FEE, as stated in Lemma 1. In particular we study how the policy variable S in ‡uences the threshold F 0 (q 0 ) (that leads to a noninnovation FEE when F > F 0 (q 0 )):
The previous equation shows that, as the cap on local emissions become less binding, i.e.
S increases, incentives to innovate decrease. We can then state the following proposition Proposition 2 A policy choice that increases the number of permits S, increases the size of the permit (and consequently the output) market leading to a decrease in the incentives to invest in clean technologies.
Let us now decompose the di¤erence in pro…ts before and after innovation, in the output market and the permits market for K ! 2: In Figure 2 and 3 the dashed red curve represents pro…ts without innovation whereas the dotted green curve represents pro…ts when the …rm is the only one innovating. The thick curve represents the di¤erence between the latter and the former situation. In Figure 2 we see that, without innovation and in an elastic demand case, as S (and consequently output production) increases, revenues in the output market also increase. Instead, when the …rm is the only one that implements the clean technology, it becomes the larger Cournot producer and therefore output revenues become decreasing in S.
Such decrease is due to the provoked decrease in the elasticity of its residual output demand.
Hence, innovation increases output revenues, but such increase is a decreasing function of S. 10 In a di¤erent setup dedicated to networks Katz and Shapiro (1985) have similar results. They also de…ne equilibria that are FEE and others where the expectations of consumers on the newtwork size is not correct. Figure 3 shows the cost in the permits market if the …rm is the buyer ( =
3
). For S su¢ ciently low (elastic demand), the price of permits increases after innovation. Then, the buyer's costs are higher after innovation than before (thick line is positive for small S).
Gathering Figure 2 By …xing S; the authority is indirectly capping production which determines the elasticity of output demand in equilibrium, both with and without innovation. Thus, by …xing S the regulator determines the change in total revenue for each …rm. This is also true in the following subsection.
Innovation FEE
For an innovation equilibrium to arise the cost of implementation must be lower than the possible increase in total revenues due to innovation, i.e. F F 2 (q 2 ). Figure 4 shows the di¤erence in output revenues when a …rm is innovating as everybody else (red dashed curve)
versus the costs when being the only one not-innovating (increasing green dotted curve). Pollution control policy covers many sectors (power, steel, aluminium, cement) with very di¤erent market con…gurations. While the power sector is well-known for facing an inelastic demand, other sectors like cement or steel are subject to international competition and therefore they may face a more elastic demand. Therefore, industries with di¤erent output markets characteristics will certainly di¤er in their innovation reaction to a pollution control policy.
Concluding Remarks
Previous literature …nds that, when the …xed cost of implementation is su¢ ciently low, innovation is always undertaken because it produces a decrease in the unit cost of production (price of permits) 11 . Sanin and Zanaj (2011) show that, when …rms are subject to a cap and trade regulation, innovation may produce an increase in permits' price that leads to a higher cost of output production. Herein we have shown that, under these conditions, 11 See, for example, Belle ‡amme and Vergari (2011).
innovation incentives can be negative, even for low …xed implementation costs. In particular, we characterize the way …rms'strength in the output market (symmetric versus asymmetric Cournot) interacts with …rms'position in the permits market (buyer or seller) to determine innovation incentives.
From the policy perspective, the allocation of permits between …rms determines whether a certain …rm is a buyer or a seller of permits and therefore the incentives that each …rm has in the permits market. Most importantly, the cap on emissions determines both the incentives in the output market (through its in ‡uence on the availability of input) and on the permits market (through its in ‡uence on permits'price).
holds.
Let us consider di¤erent expectations of …rms to see what equilibria may arise in the set fF 2 (q 2 ); F 2 (q 1 )g : For instance, assume that …rm i expects q e = q 2 ; whereas …rm j expects q e = q 1 :Then, …rm i has no incentive to innovate if i (K i ; K j ; q 2 ) i (1; K j ; q 2 ) < F F 2 (q 2 ) < F while …rm j has incentive to innovate in this same interval. Firm j innovates if she believes that q e = q 1 and j (1; K j ; q 1 ) j (1; 1; q 1 ) > F F 2 (q 1 ) > F Hence, in the set F 2 fF 2 (q 2 ); F 2 (q 1 )g the Cournot equilibrium of the game is an asymmetric
Cournot with …rm j innovating and …rm i not innovating, but this Cournot equilibrium is not a FEE.
Similarly, if …rm i believes that q e = q 0 she has incentive to innovate because i (K i ; 1; q 0 ) i (1; 1; q 0 ) > F F (q 0 ) > F while, if at the same time …rm j expects q e = q 1 ; she has no incentive to innovate because j (K i ; 1; q 1 ) j (1; 1; q 1 ) < F F 2 (q 1 ) < F Then, in the set F 2 fF 0 (q 1 ); F 0 (q 0 )g ; an asymmetric Cournot that is not a FEE prevails.
Nevertheless, in the same set of parameters, i.e. for F 2 fF 2 (q 2 ); F 2 (q 1 )g ; it is also possible that a non-innovation equilibrium arises. This equilibrium takes place if both …rms expect q e = q 2 ; but none has incentive to innovate and then i (K i ; K j ; q 2 ) i (1; K j ; q 2 ) < F F 2 (q 2 ) < F j (K i ; K j ; q 2 ) j (1; K j ; q 2 ) < F F 2 (q 2 ) < F A non innovation symmetric Cournot equilibrium that is not a FEE arises.
